ABI - National Bankruptcy Review Commission
National Bankruptcy Review Commission
Agenda for June Meeting
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
June 20, 1996
9:00 - 9:30 Opening Remarks: Personnel/Meeting
Schedule
Administrative Matters
Certification of Minutes for May Meeting
Budget Report
Review of By-Laws and Operating Procedures
Speaking Engagements/Congressional Report
Monthly Material Distributions
9:30 - 12:00 Speakers
9:30 - 9:55 American Bankruptcy Institute
9:55 - 10:00 Recess
10:00 - 12:00 American Bar Association - Business Section
American College of Bankruptcy
Commercial Law League of America
National Bankruptcy Conference
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
12:30 - 1:30 Lunch Break
1:30 - 4:30 Meeting of Working Groups
Service, Ethics
Small Business
Consumer Bankruptcy
June 21, 1996
9:00 - 9:30 Discussion and Adoption of Recommendations
Appellate Structure
Venue
9:30 - 12:30 Continued Meeting of Working Groups
Procedure
Government
Chapter 11
12:30 - 1:30 Working Lunch: Group Summaries
1:30 - 2:30 Continued Group Summaries/Open Forum
2:30 - 3:00 Administrative Matters
Arrangements for Upcoming Public Meetings
Regional Meetings
3:00 Adjournment
IMPROVING JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
PROPOSAL #1/APPEALS
Background
Title 28 gives the District Courts jurisdiction to hear appeals
from
final judgments, orders, and decrees of the bankruptcy judges. The
district
courts also have discretionary jurisdiction to hear appeals fro
interlocutory
orders and decrees of bankruptcy judges. The Courts of Appeals have
jurisdiction over appeals from all final orders, judgments and decrees
of the
district courts and of the bankruptcy appellate panels. The jurisdiction
of the
United States Supreme Court in bankruptcy matters is the same as its
jurisdiction in ordinary civil matters. 28 U.S.C. 158(a), (d).
Proposal
The current system which provides two appeals as of right from
final
orders in bankruptcy cases should be changed to eliminate district court
review.
Reasons for the Change
This provision is driven largely by concerns of cost and
efficiency.
Each appeal is an expensive excursion for both debtor and creditor who
must
work through two layers of appeals for a final resolution of their
dispute.
More importantly, the conflicting opinions and uncertainty that result
from
district court appellate decisions impose very real costs on all parties
who
use the bankruptcy system.
An important function of an appellate system is to provide stability
and
consistency in case law decision-making. In its most simple model, trial
courts
make many rulings, some of which conflict with others, and appellate
courts
review those decisions, resolving disputes and, over time, promoting
development of a coherent body of law.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to "establish a uniform law of
bankruptcies," but the bankruptcy appellate structure has yielded
opposite
results. Appeals from bankruptcy court decisions go to the district
courts,
many for de novo review of fact as well as law. The decision of
the
district court binds the parties in the case, but because there are
multiple
district courts in each district, the district court decision does not
create
binding precedent for all bankruptcy courts within the district. Only
when a
case is appealed a second time to the Court of Appeals will the decision
create
binding precedent. Only when decisions from the Court of Appeals are
appealed
to the Supreme Court is there a nationally binding decision on all the
bankruptcy courts (and other courts as well) in a bankruptcy matter.
Many, although not all, bankruptcy court opinions are published in a
separate
West reporter devoted to bankruptcy cases. Many bankruptcy opinions from
the
district courts are also published. The consequence is that about
fourteen
volumes of opinions, few of which are binding on any other future case,
are
published each year. Practitioners assert that it is possible to find a
bankruptcy opinion to support any legal proposition.
A second difficulty with the current structure is that bankruptcy court
decisions are reviewed by judges with highly variable interest in
bankruptcy
cases and differing bases of expertise in the area. As a result, a
significant
number of published decisions are not carefully reasoned.
A bankruptcy litigant has access to more appeals than a criminal
defendant, a
tax litigant, a tort victim or almost anyone else in the federal system.
Because many bankruptcy court decisions are reviewed de novo,
losing
litigants also frequently have an opportunity to recast their factual
presentations, taking two bites at the apple even before they begin an
appeal
on the legal issues. This is a wasteful system in both time and money,
with a
great deal of duplication. Parties with greater resources to withstand a
lengthy and expensive appellate process have a distinct advantage.
The Ninth Circuit provides a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) system,
and some
other circuits are following suit. A BAP is three bankruptcy judges
sitting as
a panel to hear and decide appeals from bankruptcy court decisions. But
BAP's
are a voluntary alternative, which means that any party facing an appeal
in
front of a BAP that previously has ruled unfavorably on the issue
presented in
the instant case simply refuses to consent to using the BAP. BAP's may
actually
accelerate the divergence of views on various legal questions; from a
BAP,
parties may appeal to the Court of Appeals, as they may from a district
court
decision, so that BAP's do not necessarily reduce the number of appeals.
A
combined BAP/district court appellate structure, as exists in the Ninth
Circuit, does not create binding precedent with a single appeal. The
Commissions showed no enthusiasm for a BAP structure to solve the
problems
identified.
Competing Considerations
Direct appeals to the Courts of Appeals may increase the burden
on
those appellate courts, By eliminating the first round of appeals from
the
appellate process, more cases may go to the Courts of Appeals for
resolution.
Although this will have the salutary effect of making laws that are
consistent
within the circuit, it will impose a heightened decision making burden
on the
appellate courts. Over time, however, this burden might decrease as more
issues
are settled within the circuits and fewer uncertainties linger.
Direct appeals may also exacerbate the Constitutionality problems that
inhere
in the current Article I/Article III system. While there is no
Constitutional
distinction between having a case reviewed by the District Court and by
the
Court of Appeals, the level of control currently exercised by the
bankruptcy
courts will become more evident. In the eyes of many commentators,
bankruptcy
courts are exercising the functions of Article III courts. With a more
direct
appeals process, that view could become more widespread.
IMPROVING JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
PROPOSAL #2/VENUE
Background
Title 28 provides that the proper place to file a petition under
the
Bankruptcy Code is in the district where the debtor's domicile,
residence,
principal place of business, or principal American assets have existed
for a
grater part of the preceding 180 days. Property venue also exists in any
district where a case involving a debtor's affiliate, general partner,
or
partnership is pending. 28 U.S.C. 1408.
Proposal
The current venue system should be modified to prohibit
corporate
debtors from filing for relief in a district based solely on the
debtor's
incorporation in the state where that district is located or based
solely on an
earlier filing by a subsidiary in the district. All other venue options
should
be left intact, and the court's discretionary power to transfer venue in
the
interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties should not be
restricted.
Reasons for the Change
Debtors file for bankruptcy where they are located. Most cases
involving consumer debtors or small businesses present no question about
where
to file. In some jurisdictions, near state borders, for example, some
problems
arise when debtors attempt to choose a more convenient courthouse or a
more
debtor-friendly forum. In general, however, venue issues do not arise in
these
cases.
But in a global economy, the questions of venue are not so obvious. For
multi-state corporations venue options are broad, and here is where the
mischief begins. Title 28 permits a corporation to file a bankruptcy
petition
in its state of incorporation, the location of its "principal place of
business," or the location of its "principal assets." For the
multi-state
corporation, the ability to manipulate the location of both the
"principal
place of business" and the "principal assets" provides a choice of a
number of
different jurisdictions. As more businesses incorporate in a state that
is not
where they do business, the magnitude of this opportunity, and its
effect on
the bankruptcy system, increases.
In addition to the state-of-incorporation option, Title 28 multiplies
the
opportunities for filing by corporations that have related entities. A
corporation may follow its corporate affiliate into bankruptcy in the
same
jurisdiction, even if it has no other ties to that jurisdiction. So, for
example, a corporation with an affiliate in bankruptcy in State A can
file for
bankruptcy in State A even if it meets none of the other criteria for
filing in
State A. The famous example of this method of forum selection is Eastern
Airlines. Its frequent flier club, Ionosphere, Inc., filed for
bankruptcy in
New York. The huge corporation, Eastern Airlines, then followed its tiny
affiliate into a New York bankruptcy court without establishing any
contacts
with New York.
Does forum shopping occur frequently? In their landmark study of the
bankruptcies of publicly traded companies in the 1980s, Professors Lynn
LoPucki
and William Whitford documented the companies' choices for filing
locations.
They concluded that venue could be explained ONLY by forum shopping in
about
16% of the cases, and another 63% of the cases showed some signs of
forum
shopping. In large cases, the widespread perception is that companies
can--and
frequently do--choose their fora based on a number of criteria other
than those
listed in the statute.
The reasons for forum shopping vary among debtors and their attorneys.
Some
debtors claim they choose a forum because its well-developed case law or
proximity to large, knowledgeable law firms actually decrease the cost
of the
bankruptcy. Respect for a local judiciary with demonstrated abilities to
handle
large cases may account for the disproportionate migration of large
cases to
one or two cities.
Other reasons are less benign. Professors LoPucki and Whitford identify
the
desire among debtors' counsels to go to fora that permit high attorneys'
fees
and do not pro-actively review fee applications. Gaining strategic
advantage
over other litigants, such as choosing a forum where a harmful ruling is
not
applicable, is another frequently cited reason to select one forum over
another. Sometimes a venue is chosen for its inaccessibility for certain
litigants, driving up the costs of their pursuit of their claims and
making it
difficult for them to serve on committees. Such strategies can affect
the
outcome of cases.
Professors LoPucki and Whitford demonstrate that parties cannot
effectively
fight forum shopping. The debtor nearly always makes the initial forum
selection by choosing its filing location. For creditors to protest,
they need
local counsel and they need to mount an expensive suite at the inception
of the
case. Because bankruptcy cases often have a number of issues decided in
the
first few days, judges often feel that by the end of a week, the case is
already theirs.
The law gives the initial judge great discretion in deciding forum
disputes.
Professors LoPucki and Whitford report that attorneys in big cases
explained
that judges were unlikely to turn away high-visibility cases because
they
"consider them to be career opportunities and are therefore reluctant to
transfer them to other districts." In the LoPucki-Whitford sample of
publicly
traded cases, no voluntary cases were moved after filing, despite some
challenges to venue and the fact that nearly 80% of the cases showed
some signs
of forum shopping.
Some of the costs of forum shopping, when it exists, are obvious. Forum
selection becomes a strategic tool, available for clever parties to
manipulate
outcomes to the disadvantage of smaller creditors who are cut out of the
bankruptcy process. Because forum shopping is available in its extreme
forms
only to large companies, it also involves an element of discrimination
against
smaller businesses and consumers who have no such choices.
The real costs of forum shopping, if it is widespread, might be even
greater.
The damning charge that forum shopping is used to select fora that are
fee-friendly, combined with the allegation that judges want to keep high
visibility cases, raises a troubling specter of courts competing for
big-case
bankruptcy business. If they do compete, they would do so by making
lawyer-friendly, debtor-friendly rulings. Of course, the application of
these
rulings is not limited to the mega-cases they attract; these rulings
also
affect every other business case before the courts. Given the complex
appellate
structure currently in existence and the extraordinary discretionary
decision-making vested in the bankruptcy courts, the impact of forum
shopping
is compounded. Court competition for cases could distort analysis of
legal
problems and undermine the fairness--real or perceived--of the
bankruptcy
system.
These proposals for change in forum selection criteria are not novel.
In large
part, they reflect the state of the law on forum selection in bankruptcy
prior
to the 1978 Amendments.
Competing Considerations
Restricting forum choices would undoubtedly increase litigation
over
the appropriateness of forum choices. The desire to move to a forum
where the
debtor perceived advantages could be gained would not go away. While
some
debtors could be expected to comply with the more restricted provisions,
undoubtedly there would be other debtors who would challenge the statute
at the
margins by selecting a friendly forum, prompting their creditors to
challenge
the forum choice.
"Principal place of business" is not an entirely rigid criterion. The
main
debates under this system, however, would likely be over whether the
"principal
place of business" was at the location of corporate headquarters or the
location of most of the assets. In either case, the venue choices would
be
sharply narrowed. More importantly, whatever venue was selected would
bear a
significant relationship to the operation of the business.
For some businesses, "principal place of business" would remain an
illusive
concept. As companies do more work by computer, the "virtual
headquarters" may
be located anywhere. Moreover, as more businesses consist of intangible
assets,
questions about where the assets are located or where the business
transactions
take place become ephemeral. The courts would be called on to develop
new
guidelines for new kinds of corporations.
It is important to note that not all commentators believe that forum
shopping
is an inherently evil practice. Professors LoPucki and Whitford
documented the
forum shopping practices of the publicly traded companies as they
decided where
to file for bankruptcy, but they did not conclude that such practices be
curtailed. Forum shopping permits a few courts to develop expertise in
dealing
with large bankruptcy cases. It also encourages the law to develop in
ways that
facilitate large bankruptcy reorganizations. These may be positive
,
rather than negative implications of the current system.
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