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Web posted and Copyright © 1/12/98, American
Bankruptcy Institute.
The following abstract summarizes the text of submissions made to the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission. The abstract is organized by NBRC
working group and topic.
The Final Report of the
NBRC can be viewed on-line. To obtain a copy of any document shown
below, contact the Center for Legislative Archives, Room 205, National
Archives Building, Washington, D.C. 20408. The telephone number is
202/501-5350. Mr. R. Michael McReynolds, Deputy Director, will be able
to assist with specific inquiries. (The NBRC documents will be
housed at this location until June, 1999. Thereafter, the records will
be transferred to the Center's archives in College Park,
MD.) |
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Chapter 11: Collective Bargaining Agreements
| ID |
Name |
Group |
Other |
Code
Sec |
Cross
Ref |
Problem Referenced |
Proposed Solutions |
| NBRC-0019 |
Morten S. Beyer |
President; Morten Beyer and Associates; "Reforming
the Bankruptcy Act," V.2 No. 7 MBA Aviation Oracle (Nov.
1995). |
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Labor's greed must share the blame with management
for the bankruptcies of most airlines. Intransigent unions have been at
the hear of most failures as much as incompetent management, and neither
should enjoy the fruits of reorganization. |
Unions should be curbed. Draconian wage cuts and
productivity improvements should be imposed from day one. Just as the
creditors and investors take a hair cut, so should labor in order to
keep the company going. |
| NBRC-0321 |
Christopher D. Cameron |
Author of article in the Santa Clara Law
Review |
Submission date is approximated |
1113 |
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In his article entitled "How 'Necessary' Became the
Mother of Rejection: An Empirical Look at the Fate of Collective
Bargaining Agreements on the Tenth Anniversary of Bankruptcy Code
Section 1113," author Christopher D. Cameron presents an emprircal
analysis of the question "Is section 1113 working" 34 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 841 (1994). |
The author's study concludes that organized labor's
twin goals of halting unilateral rejection of collective bargainning
agreements and reducing the perceived tendancy of bankruptcy judges to
grant rejection have been achieved. The study also indicates that the
employer's conduct at the bargainning table is far less important in the
bankruptcy judge's decision-making calculus than are the merits of his
arguments for rejection. The article concludes that "[f]or all intents
and purposes, 'necessary' under step three means the same thing as 'fair
and equitable' under step four." |
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