National
Bankruptcy Review Commission
Agenda
for June Meeting
Georgetown University Law
Center
600 New Jersey Avenue,
NW
Washington, DC 20001
June 20, 1996
9:00 - 9:30 Opening Remarks:
Personnel/Meeting Schedule
Administrative Matters
Certification of Minutes for
May Meeting
Budget Report
Review of By-Laws and Operating
Procedures
Speaking Engagements/Congressional
Report
Monthly Material Distributions
9:30
- 12:00 Speakers
9:30 - 9:55 American
Bankruptcy Institute
9:55
- 10:00 Recess
10:00 - 12:00 American
Bar Association - Business
Section
American College of Bankruptcy
Commercial Law League of
America
National Bankruptcy Conference
National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges
12:30
- 1:30 Lunch Break
1:30 - 4:30 Meeting of
Working Groups
Service, Ethics
Small Business
Consumer Bankruptcy
June
21, 1996
9:00 - 9:30 Discussion
and Adoption of Recommendations
Appellate Structure
Venue
9:30
- 12:30 Continued Meeting
of Working Groups
Procedure
Government
Chapter 11
12:30
- 1:30 Working Lunch: Group
Summaries
1:30 - 2:30 Continued
Group Summaries/Open Forum
2:30 - 3:00 Administrative
Matters
Arrangements for Upcoming
Public Meetings
Regional Meetings
3:00
Adjournment
IMPROVING
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
PROPOSAL #1/APPEALS
Background
Title 28 gives the District
Courts jurisdiction to hear
appeals from final judgments,
orders, and decrees of the
bankruptcy judges. The district
courts also have discretionary
jurisdiction to hear appeals
fro interlocutory orders
and decrees of bankruptcy
judges. The Courts of Appeals
have jurisdiction over appeals
from all final orders, judgments
and decrees of the district
courts and of the bankruptcy
appellate panels. The jurisdiction
of the United States Supreme
Court in bankruptcy matters
is the same as its jurisdiction
in ordinary civil matters.
28 U.S.C. 158(a), (d).
Proposal
The current system which
provides two appeals as
of right from final orders
in bankruptcy cases should
be changed to eliminate
district court review.
Reasons for the Change
This provision is driven
largely by concerns of cost
and efficiency. Each appeal
is an expensive excursion
for both debtor and creditor
who must work through two
layers of appeals for a
final resolution of their
dispute. More importantly,
the conflicting opinions
and uncertainty that result
from district court appellate
decisions impose very real
costs on all parties who
use the bankruptcy system.
An important function of
an appellate system is to
provide stability and consistency
in case law decision-making.
In its most simple model,
trial courts make many rulings,
some of which conflict with
others, and appellate courts
review those decisions,
resolving disputes and,
over time, promoting development
of a coherent body of law.
The Constitution authorizes
Congress to "establish a
uniform law of bankruptcies,"
but the bankruptcy appellate
structure has yielded opposite
results. Appeals from bankruptcy
court decisions go to the
district courts, many for
de novo review of
fact as well as law. The
decision of the district
court binds the parties
in the case, but because
there are multiple district
courts in each district,
the district court decision
does not create binding
precedent for all bankruptcy
courts within the district.
Only when a case is appealed
a second time to the Court
of Appeals will the decision
create binding precedent.
Only when decisions from
the Court of Appeals are
appealed to the Supreme
Court is there a nationally
binding decision on all
the bankruptcy courts (and
other courts as well) in
a bankruptcy matter.
Many, although not all,
bankruptcy court opinions
are published in a separate
West reporter devoted to
bankruptcy cases. Many bankruptcy
opinions from the district
courts are also published.
The consequence is that
about fourteen volumes of
opinions, few of which are
binding on any other future
case, are published each
year. Practitioners assert
that it is possible to find
a bankruptcy opinion to
support any legal proposition.
A second difficulty with
the current structure is
that bankruptcy court decisions
are reviewed by judges with
highly variable interest
in bankruptcy cases and
differing bases of expertise
in the area. As a result,
a significant number of
published decisions are
not carefully reasoned.
A bankruptcy litigant has
access to more appeals than
a criminal defendant, a
tax litigant, a tort victim
or almost anyone else in
the federal system. Because
many bankruptcy court decisions
are reviewed de novo,
losing litigants also frequently
have an opportunity to recast
their factual presentations,
taking two bites at the
apple even before they begin
an appeal on the legal issues.
This is a wasteful system
in both time and money,
with a great deal of duplication.
Parties with greater resources
to withstand a lengthy and
expensive appellate process
have a distinct advantage.
The Ninth Circuit provides
a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
(BAP) system, and some other
circuits are following suit.
A BAP is three bankruptcy
judges sitting as a panel
to hear and decide appeals
from bankruptcy court decisions.
But BAP's are a voluntary
alternative, which means
that any party facing an
appeal in front of a BAP
that previously has ruled
unfavorably on the issue
presented in the instant
case simply refuses to consent
to using the BAP. BAP's
may actually accelerate
the divergence of views
on various legal questions;
from a BAP, parties may
appeal to the Court of Appeals,
as they may from a district
court decision, so that
BAP's do not necessarily
reduce the number of appeals.
A combined BAP/district
court appellate structure,
as exists in the Ninth Circuit,
does not create binding
precedent with a single
appeal. The Commissions
showed no enthusiasm for
a BAP structure to solve
the problems identified.
Competing
Considerations
Direct appeals to the Courts
of Appeals may increase
the burden on those appellate
courts, By eliminating the
first round of appeals from
the appellate process, more
cases may go to the Courts
of Appeals for resolution.
Although this will have
the salutary effect of making
laws that are consistent
within the circuit, it will
impose a heightened decision
making burden on the appellate
courts. Over time, however,
this burden might decrease
as more issues are settled
within the circuits and
fewer uncertainties linger.
Direct appeals may also
exacerbate the Constitutionality
problems that inhere in
the current Article I/Article
III system. While there
is no Constitutional distinction
between having a case reviewed
by the District Court and
by the Court of Appeals,
the level of control currently
exercised by the bankruptcy
courts will become more
evident. In the eyes of
many commentators, bankruptcy
courts are exercising the
functions of Article III
courts. With a more direct
appeals process, that view
could become more widespread.
IMPROVING
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
PROPOSAL #2/VENUE
Background
Title 28 provides that the
proper place to file a petition
under the Bankruptcy Code
is in the district where
the debtor's domicile, residence,
principal place of business,
or principal American assets
have existed for a grater
part of the preceding 180
days. Property venue also
exists in any district where
a case involving a debtor's
affiliate, general partner,
or partnership is pending.
28 U.S.C. 1408.
Proposal
The current venue system
should be modified to prohibit
corporate debtors from filing
for relief in a district
based solely on the debtor's
incorporation in the state
where that district is located
or based solely on an earlier
filing by a subsidiary in
the district. All other
venue options should be
left intact, and the court's
discretionary power to transfer
venue in the interest of
justice and for the convenience
of the parties should not
be restricted.
Reasons for the Change
Debtors file for bankruptcy
where they are located.
Most cases involving consumer
debtors or small businesses
present no question about
where to file. In some jurisdictions,
near state borders, for
example, some problems arise
when debtors attempt to
choose a more convenient
courthouse or a more debtor-friendly
forum. In general, however,
venue issues do not arise
in these cases.
But in a global economy,
the questions of venue are
not so obvious. For multi-state
corporations venue options
are broad, and here is where
the mischief begins. Title
28 permits a corporation
to file a bankruptcy petition
in its state of incorporation,
the location of its "principal
place of business," or the
location of its "principal
assets." For the multi-state
corporation, the ability
to manipulate the location
of both the "principal place
of business" and the "principal
assets" provides a choice
of a number of different
jurisdictions. As more businesses
incorporate in a state that
is not where they do business,
the magnitude of this opportunity,
and its effect on the bankruptcy
system, increases.
In addition to the state-of-incorporation
option, Title 28 multiplies
the opportunities for filing
by corporations that have
related entities. A corporation
may follow its corporate
affiliate into bankruptcy
in the same jurisdiction,
even if it has no other
ties to that jurisdiction.
So, for example, a corporation
with an affiliate in bankruptcy
in State A can file for
bankruptcy in State A even
if it meets none of the
other criteria for filing
in State A. The famous example
of this method of forum
selection is Eastern Airlines.
Its frequent flier club,
Ionosphere, Inc., filed
for bankruptcy in New York.
The huge corporation, Eastern
Airlines, then followed
its tiny affiliate into
a New York bankruptcy court
without establishing any
contacts with New York.
Does forum shopping occur
frequently? In their landmark
study of the bankruptcies
of publicly traded companies
in the 1980s, Professors
Lynn LoPucki and William
Whitford documented the
companies' choices for filing
locations. They concluded
that venue could be explained
ONLY by forum shopping in
about 16% of the cases,
and another 63% of the cases
showed some signs of forum
shopping. In large cases,
the widespread perception
is that companies can--and
frequently do--choose their
fora based on a number of
criteria other than those
listed in the statute.
The reasons for forum shopping
vary among debtors and their
attorneys. Some debtors
claim they choose a forum
because its well-developed
case law or proximity to
large, knowledgeable law
firms actually decrease
the cost of the bankruptcy.
Respect for a local judiciary
with demonstrated abilities
to handle large cases may
account for the disproportionate
migration of large cases
to one or two cities.
Other reasons are less benign.
Professors LoPucki and Whitford
identify the desire among
debtors' counsels to go
to fora that permit high
attorneys' fees and do not
pro-actively review fee
applications. Gaining strategic
advantage over other litigants,
such as choosing a forum
where a harmful ruling is
not applicable, is another
frequently cited reason
to select one forum over
another. Sometimes a venue
is chosen for its inaccessibility
for certain litigants, driving
up the costs of their pursuit
of their claims and making
it difficult for them to
serve on committees. Such
strategies can affect the
outcome of cases.
Professors LoPucki and Whitford
demonstrate that parties
cannot effectively fight
forum shopping. The debtor
nearly always makes the
initial forum selection
by choosing its filing location.
For creditors to protest,
they need local counsel
and they need to mount an
expensive suite at the inception
of the case. Because bankruptcy
cases often have a number
of issues decided in the
first few days, judges often
feel that by the end of
a week, the case is already
theirs.
The law gives the initial
judge great discretion in
deciding forum disputes.
Professors LoPucki and Whitford
report that attorneys in
big cases explained that
judges were unlikely to
turn away high-visibility
cases because they "consider
them to be career opportunities
and are therefore reluctant
to transfer them to other
districts." In the LoPucki-Whitford
sample of publicly traded
cases, no voluntary cases
were moved after filing,
despite some challenges
to venue and the fact that
nearly 80% of the cases
showed some signs of forum
shopping.
Some of the costs of forum
shopping, when it exists,
are obvious. Forum selection
becomes a strategic tool,
available for clever parties
to manipulate outcomes to
the disadvantage of smaller
creditors who are cut out
of the bankruptcy process.
Because forum shopping is
available in its extreme
forms only to large companies,
it also involves an element
of discrimination against
smaller businesses and consumers
who have no such choices.
The real costs of forum
shopping, if it is widespread,
might be even greater. The
damning charge that forum
shopping is used to select
fora that are fee-friendly,
combined with the allegation
that judges want to keep
high visibility cases, raises
a troubling specter of courts
competing for big-case bankruptcy
business. If they do compete,
they would do so by making
lawyer-friendly, debtor-friendly
rulings. Of course, the
application of these rulings
is not limited to the mega-cases
they attract; these rulings
also affect every other
business case before the
courts. Given the complex
appellate structure currently
in existence and the extraordinary
discretionary decision-making
vested in the bankruptcy
courts, the impact of forum
shopping is compounded.
Court competition for cases
could distort analysis of
legal problems and undermine
the fairness--real or perceived--of
the bankruptcy system.
These proposals for change
in forum selection criteria
are not novel. In large
part, they reflect the state
of the law on forum selection
in bankruptcy prior to the
1978 Amendments.
Competing
Considerations
Restricting forum choices
would undoubtedly increase
litigation over the appropriateness
of forum choices. The desire
to move to a forum where
the debtor perceived advantages
could be gained would not
go away. While some debtors
could be expected to comply
with the more restricted
provisions, undoubtedly
there would be other debtors
who would challenge the
statute at the margins by
selecting a friendly forum,
prompting their creditors
to challenge the forum choice.
"Principal
place of business" is not
an entirely rigid criterion.
The main debates under this
system, however, would likely
be over whether the "principal
place of business" was at
the location of corporate
headquarters or the location
of most of the assets. In
either case, the venue choices
would be sharply narrowed.
More importantly, whatever
venue was selected would
bear a significant relationship
to the operation of the
business.
For some businesses, "principal
place of business" would
remain an illusive concept.
As companies do more work
by computer, the "virtual
headquarters" may be located
anywhere. Moreover, as more
businesses consist of intangible
assets, questions about
where the assets are located
or where the business transactions
take place become ephemeral.
The courts would be called
on to develop new guidelines
for new kinds of corporations.
It is important to note
that not all commentators
believe that forum shopping
is an inherently evil practice.
Professors LoPucki and Whitford
documented the forum shopping
practices of the publicly
traded companies as they
decided where to file for
bankruptcy, but they did
not conclude that such practices
be curtailed. Forum shopping
permits a few courts to
develop expertise in dealing
with large bankruptcy cases.
It also encourages the law
to develop in ways that
facilitate large bankruptcy
reorganizations. These may
be positive, rather than
negative implications of
the current system.
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